Just as a magician diverts attention from one hand onto another, dominant organizations in society engage in rhetorical strategies highlighting some things while obscuring others.
As the Upshot-Knothole series began in March of 1953, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) distributed a pamphlet in the communities downwind of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). “Continental Weapons Tests…Public Safety” illustrates some complexities of open-air atomic testing while concealing others.
Of the 14,890 words in the pamphlet “cancer” appears three times and only in regard to the use of radiation in treating disease. “Leukemia” does not merit a single reference. Of the words absent, perhaps none is more notable than “milk.” Cow’s milk was a crucial link whereby the public ingested radionuclides from Nevada fallout.
The 1953 pamphlet has a reassuring message:
“It is the Commission’s hope that in the near future there will be no occasion for alarm through lack of knowledge of the facts about levels of radiation and their degree of hazard, just as there is now no reason in actuality for alarm, since the radioactivity released by fall-out has proved not to be hazardous.”
However, it does not provide information on the precautions one could take should an unanticipated fallout event occur–dusting off or washing homegrown vegetables, clothes, hair, or children. It does not list a telephone number whereby downwind residents might solicit more information or seek advice should a fallout event ensue.
In the spring of 1955, the Commission distributed a revised pamphlet, again, highlighting some aspects of testing while concealing dimensions that might evoke concern. Atomic Test Effects in the Nevada Test Site Region advises:
“There will, however, always remain a possibility of offsite effects from flash, blast, and radioactive fall-out. The potential exposure of the public will be low and it can be reduced still further by continued public cooperation.”
Cooperation can mean different things but here it refers to quiescence. Agitation and concern, AEC officials stressed, jeopardize public safety as well as national security. The downwinders primary role entails inactivity. “Your best action is not to be worried about fall-out,” the AEC stressed.
Of note, the Commission strived to naturalize radioactivity. The 1953 pamphlet observes, “Man always has lived in a sea of nuclear radiation.” To further naturalize radiation–and neutralize public concern–the Commission equates radioactivity with electricity noting:
“Very few of us can explain electricity, although we have learned to live with it and to use it. Even fewer can explain nuclear radiation.”
And consistent with the paternalistic and instrumentally rational posture adopted, the Commission stressed the imperative to harness radioactivity in the service of humanity. The use of radiation in dental X-rays and the diagnosis of disease are highlighted as are the industrial applications. The Commission stressed:
“So, radiation is not new to our lives. In this atomic age we are living on a more familiar basis with it. It is important that we try to understand it, accept it, and use it. It is also important that we respect its powers, so that we will be guided by knowledge and not be blinded by fear of the unknown.”
In preparing for Operation Plumbbob in 1957, the AEC released another pamphlet. If the downwinder pamphlets are sleight-of-hand, the ruse becomes more recognizable by examining all three versions, together.
In particular, it instructive to examine those words that did not appear or are summoned infrequently. The relative occurrence of potentially “antagonistic” words highlights the manner whereby the downwinder pamphlets embody a particular configuration of meaning posing as a universal representation of the issue at hand.
As illustrated in Table 1, of the 29,254 words in the downwinder pamphlets “cancer” appears only four times. Leukemia and thyroid cancer–recognized effects of radiation exposure by the 1950s–are each mentioned just once. Cow’s “milk” only appears twice.
Words or phrases indicating the temporal lag between exposure to radioactivity and the expression of disease, such as “chronic,” “long-term,” and “cumulative,” are sparsely invoked. This is indicative of a focus on the acute occurrence of symptoms and avoidance of the implications of crescive exposure.
Consideration of the impact of fallout on women, infants, or children is absent in the downwinder pamphlets.
The pamphlets insist radioactivity is endemic to continental testing but is natural and amenable to understanding and control. Continental testing is an efficient use of time, labor, and materials, as well as essential to national security amidst a looming Soviet threat. Reason and rational thought have unlocked the secrets of atomic structure and guide testing at the NTS to ensure it is done with due regard for the health and safety of downwind residents.
National security, in turn, is predicated upon the imposition of radioactive fallout but the AEC is uniquely prepared to minimize the risks through methodical preparation, planning, and measurement. “Radiation is not new to our lives,” in turn, and the best option for downwind residents is acquiescence to AEC authority and expertise.
Note, too, the pamphlets included “Disney-like” drawings that risked trivializing fallout. The figure below is a typical illustration.
Many residing downwind owned Geiger counters for locating uranium deposits and fallout routinely made prospecting problematic as radioactivity dispersed across the landscape. The Commission struggled to preempt such visceral, material prompts. The figure depicts an alarmed prospector whose Geiger counter is registering radioactivity. The 1955 pamphlet counsels:
“We can expect many reports that “Geiger counters were going crazy here today.” Reports like this may worry people unnecessarily. Don’t let them bother you…If the fall-out is heavy enough to be of any significance, our monitors will be in the area and will tell you what is happening.”
The downwinders did not need soothing reassurances. They needed pertinent information on the timing of detonations, the intensity of gamma radiation, and the extent of contamination so they could make their own decisions as to how to protect themselves and their families. AEC officials were adept at releasing evocative images and newsreel footage of ascending mushroom clouds but not comprehensive, timely information on fallout location, intensity, and duration.
Protective actions were not complicated–dusting off or washing homegrown vegetables, clothes, hair, or children. And in denying the downwinders the opportunity to make their own decisions in this regard, AEC officials amplified the risks imposed upon the public.
Downwinders pamphlets (email me for copies…):
Atomic Energy Commission, “Continental Weapons Tests…Public Safety,” 31 March 1953.
Atomic Energy Commission, “Atomic Test Effects in the Nevada Test Site Region,” 7 March 1955.
Atomic Energy Commission, “Atomic Tests in Nevada,” 31 March 1957.
To the atomicdownwinders.com administrator, You always provide clear explanations and step-by-step instructions.
Thank you, Elise.